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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
BYU does not dispute that this Court has appellate jurisdiction over the June 13, 
2002 judgment made against Tremco Consultants, Inc, (the "Tremco Judgment"), which 
was certified final under UTAH R. Civ. P. 54(b). However, BYU strongly disputes that 
the Court has appellate jurisdiction over the July 10, 2002 supplemental order (the 
"Supplemental Order"). The Supplemental Order is not a final order for purposes of 
appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)(j) because Tremco Consultants, Inc. 
("Tremco"), SoftSolutions, Inc. ("SoftSolutions") and Duncan, et al.1 (collectively 
"Appellants"2) have each filed post-judgment motions pursuant to UTAH R. CiV. P. 52, 59 
and 60. "A notice of appeal filed before the disposition of any of the above motions shall 
have no effect." UTAH R. APP. P. 4(b). BYU raised this issue in connection with one of 
the procedural motions previously filed with this Court, and raises the issue here in 
accordance with this Court's May 22, 2003 Order. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. Did the District Court error in making a money judgment against Tremco 
based on Tremco's written agreement to be responsible for the debt owing to BYU? 
II. Did the District Court correctly hold under the doctrines of res judicata and 
collateral estoppel, that the facts established and issues adjudicated during the prior 
1
 Duncan, et al. is comprised of Kenneth W. Duncan ("K. Duncan"), Alvin S. Tedjamulia 
("A. Tedjamulia"), Lee A. Duncan ("L. Duncan") and their respective family companies, 
KWD Associates, L.C. ("KWD"), AST Associates, L.C. ("AST") and Julee Associates, 
L.C. ("Julee"). However, effective June 1, 2003, BYU reached a settlement agreement 
with A. Tedjamulia and AST. 
1 
binding arbitration and litigation between BYU and SoftSolutions, which were confirmed 
by the District Court and unanimously affirmed on appeal by this Court, are binding on 
Tremco as the entity that controlled, paid for and participated in the prior litigation, 
where Tremco assumed the liability to pay the obligation and where Tremco had the 
identical management as SoftSolutions? 
III. Did the District Court abuse its discretion by striking the Affidavit of 
Kenneth W. Duncan where the affidavit violated the rules of evidence, the parol evidence 
rule, and contradicted the established record in the prior proceeding? 
IV. Does this Court have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. 
§§ 78-2-2(3)(j) and 78-2a-3(2), over the Supplemental Order when Appellants each filed 
post-judgment motions pursuant to UTAH R. CiV. P. 52, 59 and 60 seeking to alter, amend 
and/or vacate the Supplemental Order and when the written order denying Appellants' 
post-judgment motions has not yet been entered by the District Court? 
V. If this Court does have jurisdiction over the Supplemental Order, does the 
Supplemental Order violate the Appellants' due process rights where Appellants had 
notice of and were represented during the hearing on the Supplemental Order, and where 
the Supplemental Order specifically provides that third-parties in possession of 
SoftSolutions' assets that are subject to execution under the Supplemental Order could 
request a hearing and raise any appropriate defense at that time? 
2BYU refers to Duncan, et al. as an Appellant because they joined in SoftSolutions' brief. 
The District Court denied Duncan, et al.'s Motion to Intervene. 
2 
VI. Did the District Court error by making a Supplemental Order based upon 
several mutually exclusive legal and equitable grounds which permit BYU to enforce the 
SoftSolutions Judgment against approximately $15 million in sale proceeds which the 
owners of SoftSolutions received from the sale of assets of the unincorporated 
association? 
VII. Did the District Court cure any alleged due process defects in the 
Supplemental Order by conducting a new hearing on the Supplemental Order and 
allowing Appellants to present any additional materials or evidence to the Court? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Findings made in the prior arbitration affirmed on appeal. This Court's original 
review of facts determined by the arbitrator in the prior litigation, which was affirmed by 
this Court on appeal, was extremely narrow. SoftSolutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young Univ., 
2000 UT 46, fl2, 1 P.3d 1095. Once the final judgment in the prior litigation was 
affirmed on appeal, the findings of fact and conclusions of law in those proceedings are 
binding under the doctrines of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel. 
Application of mixed questions of law and fact. Where there are mixed questions 
of law and fact and this Court is reviewing the District Court's decision as to whether the 
facts come within the reach of the applicable law, this Court "review[s] legal questions 
for correctness, [but] ... may grant a trial court discretion in its application of the law to a 
given fact situation." Covey v. Covey, 2003 UT App. 380, f 17, 486 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 
(quoting Jeff v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Utah 1998)); see also Jensen v. IHC 
Hospitals; Inc., 2003 UT 51, f57, 486 Utah Adv. Rep. 60 ('"If a case involves a mixed 
3 
question of fact and law, we afford some measure of discretion to the [trial] court's 
application of law to facts.") (quoting State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, f 26, 63 P.3d 650). 
Review of the Stricken Affidavit. The District Court's decision to strike the 
affidavit of Kenneth W. Duncan is subject to an abuse of discretion standard. See In the 
Matter of the General Determination of the Rights to Use of All the Water, 1999 UT 39, 
|25 , 982 P.2d 65; Jensen, 2003 UT 51, *{51 ("When the issue involves whether to admit 
or exclude evidence, the measure of discretion is broad [and] we will not reverse a trial 
court's decision unless it 'was beyond the limits of reasonability.'" (quoting State v. 
Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992)). 
Findings of Fact. This Court reviews the District Court's "findings of fact for 
clear error, reversing only where the finding is against the clear weight of the evidence, 
or. ..otherwise reach[es] a firm conviction that a mistake has been made." ProMax Dev. 
Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah App. 1997). 
Conclusions of law. The Court reviews the District Court's "legal conclusions for 
correctness, granting [them] no particular deference." Id. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)0") (appellate jurisdiction) 
UTAH CODE ANN. §16-10a-204 (liability for knowingly acting for dissolved corporation) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-1408 (shareholder liability for distributions) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-1-3 (definition of partnership) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-l-12(l)(b) (partners are jointly liable for partnership debt) 
UTAH R. APP. P. 4(b) (orders not final until post-judgment motions are adjudicated) 
UTAH R. Civ. P. 17(d) (an entity may be sued by its common name) 
UTAH R. CIV. P.69 (execution and proceedings supplemental thereto) 
4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
In prior proceedings with SoftSolutions, an unincorporated entity, BYU litigated 
to compel the payment of royalties due under BYU's D-Search (software) license 
agreement. The arbitrator awarded BYU $1,672,467, plus interest and attorneys' fees. 
After the District Court entered a judgment confirming the arbitration award (the 
"SoftSolutions Judgment"), which this Court unanimously affirmed in SoftSolutions, Inc. 
v. Brigham Young, supra, BYU attempted to collect the SoftSolutions Judgment. 
Until very recently, BYU's collection efforts were largely unsuccessful because all 
of SoftSolutions' assets were being held by third-parties, including to SoftSolutions' 
owners and associated entities. Even though WordPerfect Corporation ("WordPerfect") 
paid over $15,000,000 to SoftSolutions' owners to buy the stock in SoftSolutions 
Technology Corporation ("SoftSolutions Technology"), whose only asset was software 
based on BYU's D-Search technology, they paid nothing to BYU. 
BYU brought this action because Tremco agreed in writing to be responsible to 
pay BYU's claims for D-Search license royalties. In fulfillment of its assumplion and in 
an attempt to protect its financial interest in the outcome of the litigation against BYU, 
Tremco controlled, participated in and paid for the arbitration and litigation with BYU. 
Accordingly, Tremco is bound by the findings and conclusions in the prior arbitration and 
litigation and is obligated under its written agreement to pay the claims owing to BYU. 
Tremco and others continued SoftSolutions' business (without the protection of 
SoftSolutions' corporate veil) for years after SoftSolutions was dissolved. As such, the 
5 
owners were involved in an unincorporated association, and BYU is entitled to use the 
jointly owned property of that association to satisfy the SoftSolutions Judgment. 
In addition to the proceedings and judgment entered against Tremco, BYU also 
sought and obtained a Supplemental Order from the District Court to assist BYU in 
collecting the SoftSolutions Judgment from those who had received the business assets of 
SoftSolutions. The Supplemental Order allows BYU to execute on SoftSolutions' assets 
that are in the hands of third-parties, if those parties had notice of BYU's claims at the 
time they received the property, including the nearly $15,000,000 in proceeds some of the 
owners received from the sale of SoftSolutions Technology stock in 1994. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
From September 26-29, 1995, BYU and SoftSolutions engaged in arbitration 
before retired Judge John A. Rokich. During the four-days of arbitration, Judge Rokich 
heard the testimony of witnesses, admitted documentary evidence and reviewed lengthy 
memoranda submitted by counsel. (R2000. 52.) After the arbitration, Judge Rokich 
issued his Memorandum Decision, and determined that BYU was owed $1,672,467 in 
past-due royalty payments for D-Search. (R. 2000. 44.) 
On July 26,1996, SoftSolutions filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment in the 
Fourth District Court, seeking to have the arbitration award vacated or modified. (R2000. 
31.) On February 12, 1998, Fourth District Court Judge Fred D. Howard, confirmed the 
arbitration award and entered the SoftSolutions Judgment in the amount of $2,278,679.02 
(including pre-judgment interest), plus post-judgment interest and attorneys' fees, in 
6 
favor of BYU. (R2000. 39.) This Court affirmed the SoftSolutions Judgment (with a 
modification to BYU's attorneys' fees calculation) in SoftSolutions, Inc., 2000 UT 46. 
BYU then commenced legal action in the Fourth District Court to compel Tremco 
to pay the SoftSolutions Judgment in the case of Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremco 
Consultants, Inc., et al, Civil No. 000400088. (R2000. 1-96). On July 25, 2000, the 
District Court found a commonality of issues existed and granted BYU's motion to 
consolidate the two cases. (R. 669-72). 
Thereafter, Tremco filed an Answer and Counterclaim, (R2000. 228-337), which 
BYU promptly moved to dismiss (R. 488-668). Tremco responded with a motion for 
summary judgment (R. 676-743), to wrhich BYU replied with its own motion for partial 
summary judgment and declaratory relief (R. 846-81). After extensive briefing which 
lasted over a year and a comprehensive hearing on April 10, 2002, the District Court-
issued its ruling on May 13, 2002. The Ruling granted BYU's motion for partial 
summary judgment and declaratory relief; denied Tremco's motion for summary 
judgment; and granted BYU's motion to dismiss Tremco's counterclaims. (R. 1034-52.) 
Accordingly, on June 13, 2002, the District Court entered a money judgment against 
Tremco to pay the indebtedness owing to BYU which it had agreed in writing to pay (the 
"Tremco Judgment"). (R. 1053-57.) On July 3, 2002, Tremco filed its notice of appeal 
of the Tremco Judgment. (R. 1056-60). 
At the time that BYU filed its motion for partial summary judgment and 
declaratory relief against Tremco, BYU also requested a supplemental order to assist 
BYU in satisfying the SoftSolutions Judgment from the prior business assets of 
7 
SoftSolutions or from the proceeds obtained therefrom. (R. 848-49, 968, 1642-43.) On 
July 10, 2002, the District Court entered the Supplemental Order. (R. 1138-51.) 
After the Supplemental Order was entered, SoftSolutions, Tremco and Duncan, et 
al. each filed post-judgment motions to vacate, alter and/or amend the Supplemental 
Order pursuant to UTAH R. APP. P. 52, 59 and 60. (R. 1155-57, 1476-81, 1492-96.) The 
District Court denied the post-judgment motions on July 22, 2003. (R. Supp. 86-87)3 
Although proposed orders and objections thereto have been submitted, a formal written 
order denying the post-judgment motions has not yet been entered by the District Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Where indicated, the facts were established in prior proceedings, as set forth in 
Judge Rokich's Memorandum Decision (R2000. 41-52) and the District Court's Ruling 
on BYU's Motion to Confirm Arbitration and SoftSolution's Motion to Vacate or Modify 
Arbitration Award (R2000. 5-39) and are binding on Tremco, which paid for and 
controlled those proceedings. (R. 1030-32.) 
D-Search and the SoftSolutions Association 
1. In the early 1980s, BYU and its professors began developing an 
algorhythm, which when properly applied, was capable of rapidly searching large textual 
databases (the "D-Search" algorhythm). (R2000. 38-39.) It was soon apparent that D-
Search's patented indexing and information retrieval capabilities had significant value 
3
 As directed in this Court's November 17, 2003 Order, BYU submitted an Addendum to 
Appellee's Brief with this Brief which contains materials that should be part of the record. 
BYU cites to these materials "according to their position in the addendum" as "R. Supp." 
8 
when properly used with commercial software applications. (R2000. 38-39.) Indeed, 
SoftSolutions made millions of dollars from its use of D-Search. (R2000. 44.) 
2. In April 1987 and continuing through June 1990, BYU entered into a series 
of license agreements with Tremco, Tremco d/b/a SoftSolutions, and SoftSolutions for 
the use of D-Search in their products. (R2000. 39, 52; R. 1040-41.) The license 
agreements culminated in and were superseded by the 1990 Exclusive License 
Agreement, which constituted a single exclusive license and which treated Tremco and 
SoftSolutions as a single licensee. (R2000. 12-13, 18; R. 560-574; 1040-1041.) 
SoftSolutions and Tremco agreed to pay BYU royalties in exchange for the D-Search 
license. (R2000. 38, 51; R. 1040-41.) 
3. Tremco, SoftSolutions and SoftSolutions Technology were involved 
together in an unincorporated partnership or association (the "Association"). (R. 1044-
45.) SoftSolutions was the parent company that incorporated SoftSolutions Technology 
and originally owned all of SoftSolutions Technology's stock. (R. Supp. 63.) 
SoftSolutions entered into and held all of the D-Search licenses which wrere used by 
Tremco and SoftSolutions Technology. (R. 560-75.) The license to use D-Search was 
SoftSolutions' only asset. (R. 1043; R. Supp. 62). Tremco and SoftSolutions 
Technology used the D-Search license held by SoftSolutions, and handled operations and 
marketing of the product containing D-Search. (R. Supp. 62). 
4. The unincorporated Association conducted business as SoftSolutions, Inc. 
(R2000. 38), Tremco d/b/a SoftSolutions (R. 619), and as SoftSolutions, Inc. d/b/a 
SoftSolutions Technology Corporation. (R2000. 19.). 
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5. Other participants inthe Association were Kenneth Duncan ("K. Duncan"), 
Alvin Tedjamulia ("A. Tedjamulia") and Lee Duncan ("L. Duncan"), who controlled the 
Association as the officers and directors of Tremco, SoftSolutions and SoftSolutions 
Technology. (R2000. 22.)4 K. Duncan, Tedjamulia and L. Duncan also controlled the 
Association through their respective family entities KWD, AST and Julee, which 
maintained virtually exclusive ownership of the Association and its assets. (R. 1148-49.) 
6. On November 1, 1992, the State of Utah involuntarily dissolved 
SoftSolutions as a corporation. (R. 507, 1045.) The corporate entity of SoftSolutions was 
never reinstated. (R. 1148-49.) 
7. SoftSolutions' officers intentionally and knowingly allowed SoftSolutions 
to be dissolved. (R. Supp. 60-61.) 
8. At the time of SoftSolutions5 dissolution, instead of returning the D-Search 
license to BYU as required, SoftSolutions transferred D-Search to SoftSolutions 
Technology and Tremco, who continued SoftSolutions' business without the protection 
of a corporate veil. (R2000. 18-19; R. Supp. 62.) SoftSolutions did not receive value for 
transferring D-Search to Tremco and SoftSolutions Technology. (R. Supp. 62.) 
9. Since November 1, 1992, SoftSolutions' business was continued by the 
members of the Association. (R. 507, 1045, 1148-49; R2000. 338-34.) During that time, 
the Association continued to use BYU's license and gained significant revenues from 
sales of products containing that license (R2000. 44), and thereby incurred significant 
4
 SoftSolutions, Tremco, and SoftSolutions Technology shared identical officers. 
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obligations to BYU for the royalties on the products marketed and sold by Tremco and 
SoftSolutions Technology. (R. 1147; R2000. 338-48, SoftSolutions, Inc., 2000 UT 46.) 
10. Because the royalties owed to BYU had not been paid, the Association also 
obtained legal counsel, negotiated, mediated, arbitrated and litigated with BYU after 
SoftSolutions was dissolved. (R. 1044-46; R2000. 338-48, SoftSolutions v. BYU, 2000 
UT 46, Ht 5-7.) 
The Association Prepared SoftSolutions Technology to be sold to WordPerfect 
11. As the arbitration and litigation with BYU became imminent, SoftSolutions 
Technology, which had continued SoftSolutions' business after SoftSolutions was 
dissolved, approached WordPerfect in an attempt to sell SoftSolutions Technology to 
WordPerfect. (R. 1264; R. Supp 64.) 
12. WordPerfect was interested in purchasing SoftSolutions Technology, 
including its sole asset D-Search and ihe good will associated therewith. (R. 1043; Supp. 
R. Supp. 64-67.) However, because BYU's significant claims for the D-Search royalties 
remained unresolved, WordPerfect required certain arrangements to be made before the 
sale could be finalized. (R. 1263.) 
13. First, Tremco was required to execute an agreement (the "Tremco 
Agreement") whereby "Tremco consented] and acknowledge^] that Tremco is the 
responsible party with respect to the BYU claims and is solely responsible for the defense 
and pursuit of claims with respect to that matter." (R. 521-22, 1047.) 
14. Second, WordPerfect required the members of the Association, to 
acknowledge in the Stock Purchase Agreement that Tremco was "the primary obligor" of 
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the royalties owing to BYU. (R. 1234, 1244-45). The Stock Purchase Agreement was 
signed by K. Duncan, L. Duncan and Tedjamulia, individually and in their respective 
representative capacities as officers of SoftSolutions Technology, and managers of KWD, 
ASTandJulee. (R. 1244-45.) 
15. Third, WordPerfect required that the purchase price paid for SoftSolutions 
Technology stock could be reduced based on BYU's claims regarding D-Search. (R. 
1263.) Indeed, the Stock Purchase Agreement expressly states that "any liabilities or 
losses suffered by [SoftSolutions Technology] after the Closing arising out of or related 
to claims made by Brigham Young University in connection with its licenses entered into 
prior to the Closing Date with [SoftSolutions Technology] or its former affiliates shall 
be Setoff amounts." (R. 1263.) (emphasis added.) 
16. Thus, the parties that received proceeds from the sale of SoftSolutions 
Technology stock to WordPerfect (i.e. KWD, AST and Julee) expressly contemplated 
and agreed that those sale proceeds could be used to satisfy BYU's claims regarding D-
Search. (R. 1244-45, 1263.) 
17. To comply with the provision allowing the proceeds of the stock sale to 
WordPerfect to pay BYU, the Association set aside approximately $1,000,000 in account 
no. 42016683 at First Interstate Bank to pay liabilities arising from the D-Search 
litigation. (R. 401-05.) On February 8, 1996, however, A. Tedjamulia and L. Duncan 
transferred the money and closed that account. BYU was not paid any of the money 
specifically set aside to pay for the SoftSolutions Judgment. 
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Tremco Paid For and Controlled the Arbitration and the Prior Litigation with BYU. 
18. After failed attempts to collect the royalties owed to BYU, the parties 
appeared before an arbitrator. (R2000. 22.) 
19. In fulfillment of its responsibilities under the Tremco Agreement and the 
Stock Purchase Agreement, Tremco hired Earl Jay Peck and the law firm of Neilson & 
Senior to represent SoftSolutions against BYU. (R. 22, 1030-32, 1234.) BYU was 
represented by its in-house counsel throughout the arbitration proceedings. (R. 22.) 
20. Tremco, through its officers and directors, participated in, controlled and 
paid for the arbitration and litigation against BYU. (R. 1030-32.) 
21. In addition, Tremco caused its own arguments to be presented during the 
litigation with BYU. Indeed, Tremco caused Nielson 8c Senior to argue among other 
things that Tremco's license with BYU was separate from SoftSolutions' license and that 
its saies should not be included in BYU's royalty award. (R2000. 32-33; R. 1030-32.) 
Tremco also caused Nielsen & Senior to argue that royalties should not accrue on the sale 
of "CLASS Conflicts of Interest product developed and sold by a separate licensee, 
Tremco Consultants, Inc. pursuant to a separate license agreement." (R2000. 13.) 
22. Indeed, not only did Tremco have the opportunity to raise its arguments 
during the litigation with BYU, it acknowledged in the Tremco Agreement that it "has 
been involved in defending that action and has, itself, asserted various claims against 
BYU as offsets or absolute defenses/' (R2000. 8, 32-33; R. 522.) 
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23. On July 3, 1996, after receiving extensive testimony and evidence, the 
arbitrator awarded BYU $1,672,467 in past-due royalties incurred from 1990 to March of 
1996, $115,000 in attorneys' fees, and interest thereon. (R2000. 11-22.) 
24. Thereafter, Tremco caused SoftSolutions to contest the arbitrator's award to 
BYU by filing a lawsuit in 1996 in the Fourth District Court.5 (R2000. 46-56, 1030-32.) 
Tremco elected to bring the lawsuit under the name of SoftSolutions, Inc., which is one 
of the common names under which the Association was conducting SoftSolutions' 
business. (R2000. 56, R. 1030-32.) 
25. On February 10, 1998, Judge Howard issued his Ruling on Defendant's 
Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award and Plaintiffs Motion to Vacate or Modify 
Arbitration Award which confirmed the arbitrator's Memorandum Decision in favor of 
BYU. (R. 190-224.) On July 7, 1998 the SoftSolutions Judgment was entered in favor of 
BYU. (R. 283-284.) 
26. On May 17, 2000, this Court affirmed the SoftSolutions Judgment and 
affirmed that SoftSolutions had incurred obligations to pay royalties of $1,672,467 on 
sales made up to March 1996—years after SoftSolutions' corporate entity had been 
dissolved. (R. 1051, R2000. 338-48; see SoftSolutions, Inc. 2000 UT 461 5. 
BYU Sued Tremco to Collect the SoftSolutions Judgment 
27. After obtaining the SoftSolutions Judgment, BYU commenced a second 
lawsuit against Tremco to compel Tremco to pay the SoftSolutions Judgment as it had 
5
 The suit was filed over 3/4 years after the dissolution of SoftSolutions (R. 507.) 
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agreed in both the Tremco Agreement and the Stock Purchase Agreement. (R2000. 5-96; 
R 522, 1234.) The Summons and Complaint in that action were served upon K. Duncan 
as Tremco's registered agent on March 31, 2000. (R2000. 99.) 
28. Because Tremco controlled and paid for the litigation that gave rise to the 
SoftSolutions Judgment, BYU moved the District Court to consolidate the action against 
Tremco with the SoftSolutions' matter. (R2000. 102-104). BYU served a copy of its 
Motion to Reassign and/or to Consolidate With Case No. 960400497 (the "Motion to 
Consolidate") and supporting memorandum upon attorney Earl Jay Peck at the law firm 
of Nielsen & Senior. (R. 102, 105.) 
29. After receiving BYU's Motion to Consolidate, Mr. Peck contacted BYU's 
counsel and represented to BYU that because of an unspecified conflict or change of 
events, Nielsen & Senior was not going to be involved any farther in the litigation against 
BYU. (R. Supp. 58.) Mr, Peck further informed BYU's counsel that the law firm of 
Berman, Gaufin, Tomsic & Campbell (the "Berman Firm") would be handling the 
dispute. (R. Supp. 58.) Mr. Peck also specifically instructed BYU that all future 
pleadings and correspondence should be served on the Berman Firm and that no future 
pleadings should be served on him at Nielsen & Senior. (R. Supp. 58.) 
30. Although BYU had originally served its Motion to Consolidate on Nielson 
& Senior, the Berman Firm filed a memorandum in opposition to BYU's Motion to 
Consolidate in accordance with the representations from Mr. Peck. (R2000. 183-192.) 
Also in harmony with Mr. Peck's representation to BYU's counsel, no written response 
of any kind was filed by Nielsen & Senior and the Berman Firm did not serve its 
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opposition memorandum on Nielson & Senior even though the Motion to Consolidate 
was originally served only upon Mr. Peck. (R. Supp. 58; R2000. 183.) 
31. As a result of the representations made by Mr. Peck and the fact that the 
Berman Firm did not serve its memorandum in opposition to BYU's Motion to 
Consolidate on Nielsen & Senior, B YU caused its reply memorandum to be served upon 
the Berman Firm. (R2000. 198.) Indeed, from that time forward no party served any 
papers upon Nielson & Senior (although Tremco continued to provide Nielson & Senior 
with copies of BYU's pleadings and Mr. Peck and Nielson & Senior remained involved 
in reviewing pleadings and formulating litigation strategy). (R. Supp. 83-85.) 
32. In light of the foregoing, the District Court held that 
it is distinctively clear that the agreement was reached between Berman's 
office and [Nielson & Senior] that Berman's office would take over the 
active participation in the activity of the case ... [Nielson & Senior] stepped 
behind the curtain. Mr. Peck was no longer the front person, no longer the 
lawyer that was participating and being seen with respect to court 
appearances. But Mr. Berman's office was. 
(R. Supp. 88.) The District Court's statement is consistent with Tremco5s 
admission that it controlled and paid for SoftSolutions' defense of the D-Search 
claims. (R. 521-22, 1047.) 
33. On or about May 31, 2000, after the foregoing pleadings had been filed, the 
Berman Firm served a pleading entitled Supplemental Notice to BYU which indicated 
that this Court had affirmed the SoftSolutions Judgment. (R2000. 350.) 
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34. On July 25, 2000, Fourth District Judge Gary D. Stott ordered that the 
newly filed action against Tremco (i.e., case no. 000400088) be consolidated with the 
original action, (i.e., case no. 96040097). (R2000. 383-86.) 
35. Tremco filed its Answer and Counterclaim asserting that BYU breached the 
D-Search license agreements, which claims Tremco had already litigated during 
SoftSolutions' arbitration and litigation. (R2000. 309-13.) 
36. In response, BYU filed its Motion to Dismiss Tremco's Counterclaim and 
argued that in the prior litigation, which Tremco had controlled and participated in, the 
arbitrator and the District Court had found that Tremco and SoftSolutions were a single 
licensee (R. 12-13, R2000. 365 -66), that Tremco's claims were properly adjudicated by 
the arbitrator and affirmed by the District Court and this Court (R. 12-13, R2000. 359-
60), and that BYU did not breach the D-Search license agreement. (R. 2, R2000. 358-59). 
BYU also argued that Tremco's counterclaims were barred by the statute of limitations 
(R2000. 357-58.) 
37. Tremco then filed a single memorandum in opposition to BYU's Motion to 
Dismiss and in support of its own motion for summary judgment, (R. 673-743.) 
38. Tremco also filed the Affidavit of Kenneth W. Duncan and attempted to 
introduce "facts" which contradicted the facts established during the prior arbitration and 
subsequent litigation with BYU. (R. 744-831; R. 885-86.) 
39. BYU responded that the issues raised in Tremco's motion for summary 
judgment had been previously litigated thereby precluding summary judgment for 
Tremco. (R. 849, 885-86.) BYU also moved the District Court to strike the Affidavit of 
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Kenneth W. Duncan because, among other things, it contradicted the record already 
established during the SoftSolutions litigation. (R. 882-88.) 
40. On October 13, 2000, BYU filed its Motion for Declaratory Relief and 
Partial Summary Judgment requesting the following relief with regard to Tremco: 
1. An order of partial summary judgment.. .that Tremco was a privy to 
the earlier litigation held before this Court, and that it is therefore bound by 
the final judgment of this Court. 
2. An order of summary judgment.. .that BYU is a third-party creditor 
beneficiary under the terms of the 1994 Agreement. 
(R. 848.) 
41. BYU further requested that the District Court enter a supplemental order to 
assist BYU in recovering SoftSolutions' assets from third parties in possession of 
SoftSolutions' property. As set forth below, BYU alleged numerous grounds in support 
ofits motion. (R. 848-49.) 
42. On September 7, 2001, BYU filed its Reply Memorandum in Support of it 
Motion for Declaratory Relief and Partial Summary Judgment ("BYU's Reply Memo"), 
wherein BYU reiterated its argument that: 
BYU's judgment is indeed enforceable against [SoftSolutions], and 
the proceeds therefrom including the money paid to Tremco and its 
officers and directors, Duncan, Duncan and Tedjamulia, for the 
stock in [SoftSolutions Technology]. As such, BYU is entitled to an 
order allowing BYU to execute upon all of the consideration paid by 




43. BYU also undertook a "Factual Analysis" to assist the District Court to 
determine there was no genuine issue as to any material fact because the factual record 
from the previous litigation was binding on Tremco. (R. 976-84.) 
44. Shortly before the scheduled hearing on the parties' motions, Tremco 
signed a written stipulation that its officers, K. Duncan, L. Duncan and Tedjamulia were 
in direct control of the prior arbitration. (R. 1032.) Tremco also stipulated therein that it 
paid the legal fees for the prior arbitration. (R. 1031.) 
45. Because BYU sought an order allowing it to enforce the SoftSolutions 
Judgment against parties who had received proceeds from the stock sale to WordPerfect, 
BYU subpoenaed copies of the checks paid for the purchase of the SoftSolutions 
Technology stock from WordPerfect. Those checks were not produced by WordPerfect 
until after the hearing on the parties' motions. (R. 1629.) 
46. On April 10, 2002, the parties appeared before the Honorable Fred D. 
Howard for a hearing on the pending motions. (R. 1150-51.) In attendance were Steven 
W. Call, Herschel J. Saperstein, Bruce L. Olson, Michael D. Mayfield, Samuel O. Gaufin 
and Eric K. Schnibbe. (R. 1056.) SoftSolutions Association members K. Duncan, 
L. Duncan and Tedjamulia were in the courtroom during the entire hearing. (R. 1056.) 
47. During the hearing, Judge Howard confirmed that the Supplemental Order 
should provide that third parties holding SoftSolutions' property would have the right to a 
hearing prior to any execution sale to protect their due process rights. (R. 1642-43,) 
48. On May 14, 2002, the District Court rendered its Ruling re: 1) Plaintiffs 
Motion for Declaratory Relief and Partial Summary Judgment; 2) Defendant's Motion for 
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Summary Judgment; 3) Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss Defendant's Counterclaim; 4) 
Plaintiffs Objection to and Motion to Strike Affidavit of Kenneth W. Duncan; and 5) 
Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion. (R. 1043-52.) 
49. The District Court granted BYU's motion to dismiss Tremco's 
counterclaims, ruling that Tremco was a privy to the prior litigation, that its claims were 
or could have been brought in the previous case, that the issues were fully and fairly 
litigated, and that a final judgment had been entered. (R. 1039-41.) Based thereon, the 
District Court concluded that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel barred 
Tremco's counterclaims (R. 1039.) Alternatively, the District Court also concluded that 
Tremco's counterclaims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations.6 (R. 1039.) 
50. The District Court also granted BYU's motion for partial summary 
judgment against Tremco, and held that Tremco's interests had "been legally represented 
in the first action and that it was privy to the prior litigation. As such it is bound by the 
final judgment." (R. 1048.) The Court also found that Tremco was part of the 
Association and therefore BYU was entitled to enforce the SoftSolutions Judgment 
against jointly owned property of the Association held by Tremco. (R. 1045-48.) The 
District Court also ruled that BYU was a third-party beneficiary to the Tremco 
Agreement and could enforce it against Tremco. (R. 1045-48.). 
6
 Tremco has not appealed the District Courf s determination that Tremco's 
counterclaims were barred by the statute of limitations. As such, this Court cannot 
reverse the District's decision granting BYU's Motion to Dismiss Tremco's 
Counterclaims. 
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51. Regarding BYU's request for a Supplemental Order to aid BYU in 
collecting the SoftSolutions Judgment, the District Court ruled that: (1) Tremco, 
SoftSolutions and SoftSolutions Technology were involved in an unincorporated 
association, and that BYU could recover property in which the participants of the 
association have a joint interest, and (2) SoftSolutions fraudulently transferred its assets 
to SoftSolutions Technology and SoftSolutions Technology sold those assets to 
WordPerfect in exchange for valuable proceeds. (R. 1035, 1042, 1044.) 
52. On June 13, 2002, the District Court entered its money judgment against 
Tremco (the "Tremco Judgment"). (R. 1053-57.) On July 3, 2002, Tremco filed a notice 
of appeal of the Tremco Judgment. (R. 1099-1101.) 
53. In compliance with the District Court's Ruling BYU also prepared the 
proposed Supplemental Order which allowed BYU the right to levy and execute on all of 
the WordPerfect sale proceeds received by any party having knowledge of BYU's claims 
prior to the sale of SoftSolutions Technology stock to WordPerfect. On June 24, 2002, 
BYU served a copy of the proposed Supplemental Order on the Berman Firm. (R. 1140.) 
54. After the foregoing hearing, Novell, Inc. (WordPerfect's successor) 
produced to BYU copies of checks reflecting payments in the amount of $13,525,779 to 
KWD, AST and Julee for SoftSolutions Technology stock. (R. 1629.) 
55. Because the District Court ruled that BYU could satisfy the SoftSolutions 
Judgment from the proceeds of the sale of SoftSolutions Technology stock to 
WordPerfect, BYU submitted to the District Court the checks from WordPerfect as well 
as records from the state of Utah identifying the parties who had received the checks. (R. 
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1628-29.) The District Court approved BYU's written application to submit the check 
information in the proposed order. (R. 1136-38). BYU labeled these documents as 
Exhibits L and M. (R. 1065-1082.) 
56. BYU served a copy of its proposed Supplemental Order upon the Berman-
Firm, who represented SoftSolutions. (R. 1080). No objection to the form or content of 
the proposed Supplemental Order was made by any party prior to July 5, 2002 (the time 
period allowed by UTAH R. APP. P.§ 4-504 for objections.) 
57. The District Court entered the Supplemental Order on July 10, 2002 , which 
was five days after the deadline for filing objections had passed. (R. 1141.) 
58. There is no dispute that Exhibits L and M are valid and that the payees 
identified thereon received said monies. (R. 1065-82; R. Supp. 70-71.) 
59. The Supplemental Order is not based on the Tremco Judgment, and the 
Supplemental Order unequivocally states on its face that it is made to assist BYU with a 
collection of the SoftSolutions Judgment. (R. 1150.) 
60. To protect the rights of third-parties, the Supplemental Order also expressly 
provides that "any writ of execution or writ of garnishment issued in connection with this 
Court's [SoftSolutions'] Judgment and this Supplemental Order shall be accompanied by 
a Request for Hearing which a person may file with the Court to obtain a hearing before 
the Court in connection with such execution or garnishment." (R. 1141-42.) 
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Appellants File The Post-Judgment Motions. 
61. Within days after entry of the Supplemental Order, Appellants each filed 
post-judgment motions (collectively, the "Post-Judgment Motions") seeking to vacate, 
alter and/or amend the Supplemental Order. (R. 1155-1157.) 
62. SoftSolutions and Duncan, et al.'s post-judgment motions were filed on 
July 25, 2002, pursuant to Rules 52(b), 59(a), 59(e) and 60(b). (R. 1476-81; 1492-96.) 
Tremco's post-judgment motion was filed on or about July 22, 2002, and does not 
expressly identify the rule on which it is based. (R. 1155-57.) 
63. In their Joint Docketing Statement, SoftSolutions and Duncan, et al. 
admitted that they "timely filed separate motions to vacate, alter and amend, and to set 
aside the Supplemental Order under Rule 52(b), 59(b), 59(e) and 60(b) (Utah R Civ. P.)." 
Joint Docketing Statement, p. 2 (September 18, 2002). 
64. In addition to the filing of the Post-Judgment Motions, several parties, who 
are currently in possession of the traceable proceeds from SoftSolutions' property, 
including Duncan, et al., requested hearings with the District Court in attempts to quash 
writs of execution and/or garnishments issued on the SoftSolutions Judgment in 
accordance with the Supplemental Order. 
65. Rannoch, L.L.C. and Carie, L.L.C. (both of which are controlled by K. 
Duncan) have obtained hearings before the District Court regarding the Supplemental 
Order. The hearings were granted pursuant to UTAH R. CiV. P. 69 as contemplated by the 
Supplemental Order, which expressly provides that third parties holding SoftSolutions5 
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property would have the opportunity to be heard before that property could be used to 
satisfy the SoftSolutions Judgment. (R. 1141-42.) 
66. On June 3, 2003, counsel for Tremco, SoftSolutions Duncan, et aL, and 
BYU met at a supplemental hearing before the District Court. At that time, the District 
Court scheduled a global hearing on all outstanding motions to allow all interested parties 
an opportunity to be heard on any items they wished to address, including the Appellants' 
motions to alter and amend the Supplemental Order. (R. Supp. 79.) 
67. On July 22, 2003, a hearing was held on the Post-Judgment Motions and 
the objections and motions to quash various writs of execution and garnishment issued on 
the SoftSolutions Judgment and the Supplemental Order. (R. Supp. 79.) 
68. During that hearing, the Court allowed Tremco, SoftSolutions and Duncan, 
et al. to proceed as they desired and to make any arguments they wished regarding the 
pending motions and the Supplemental Order. (R. Supp. 80.) 
69. During the July 22, 2003 hearing, counsel for Duncan, et al. acknowledged 
that the Supplemental Order was not a final order that could be appealed because of the 
various Post-Judgment Motions: 
. . .This July 10 order is not yet a final order, it is not yet appealable 
because of the post judgment motions which preclude its being determined 
a final order until such time as these motions are either granted or denied. 
And at that time, then if there needs to be an appeal then the appeal would 
go forward as a final order. 
(R. Supp. 81-82.) 
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70. At the conclusion of the hearing Judge Stott ruled from the bench and 
denied the Post-Judgment Motions to alter, amend and vacate the Supplemental Order 
filed by Tremco, SoftSolutions and Duncan, et al. (R. Supp. 87) 
71. Judge Stott specifically found that "there have been no due process 
violations by Judge Howard as to the July 10th 2000 [Supplemental Order].'* (R. Supp. 
86-87.) Judge Stott also that found that BYU wras entitled to execute on the proceeds of 
the sale of SoftSolutions Technology stock to WordPerfect. (R. Supp. 89.) 
72. Although an oral ruling was made from the bench, the District Court has 
not yet entered its written order denying the Post-Judgment Motions and the motions to 
quash the various writs of execution and garnishment filed by BYU. 
RESPONSE TO APPELLANTS5 STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Tremco's statement of facts is based virtually entirely on the Affidavit of Kenneth 
W. Duncan, which was stricken by the District Court. (R. 1036-1038.) As set forth in 
Point VIII below, the District Court correctly found that K. Duncan's Affidavit was 
inadmissible and insufficient evidence because it violated the parol evidence rule, 
attempted to introduce conclusory statements, and was not based on his personal 
knowledge. (R. 1036-1038.) 
More importantly, the mere filling of an affidavit by K. Duncan, let alone one that 
has been stricken, can not contradict established findings within rulings and final orders 
from the previous litigation, which Tremco controlled, paid for and participated in. Thus, 
this Court should not consider Tremco's inadmissible facts in determining whether the 
Tremco Judgment was proper. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. A money judgment was properly made by the Court against Tremco 
because Tremco had agreed in writing to assume the indebtedness owing to BYU for the 
D-Search royalties. BYU had a lawful right to enforce the assumption agreement 
because BYU was a third-party beneficiary under Utah law. 
2. Tremco is bound by res judicata and collateral estoppel with respect to the 
claims and issues asserted by BYU because Tremco completely controlled and paid for 
the prior litigation between BYU and SoftSolutions because it had assumed the debt. 
A. The existence of separate entities does not preclude application of the privy 
doctrine under the concepts of res judicata and collateral estoppel. 
B. The claims and issues for breach of the license agreement which Tremco 
alleged against BYU are identical to those raised in the prior litigation. 
C. The claims and issues asserted by Tremco were completely, fully and fairly 
litigated in the prior litigation between BYU and SoftSolutions. 
D. The prior suit between BYU and SofSolutions resulted in a final Judgment 
which was made on the merits of the same claims and issues. 
3. This Court lacks appellate jurisdiction to review the July 10, 2002 
Supplemental Order. The Supplemental Order is not a final order for purposes of appeal 
because Appellants filed post-judgment motions to alter and amend the Supplemental 
Order under UTAH R. Civ. P. 52, 59 and 60 for which a final order has not been made. 
4. The Supplemental Order made by the Court correctly permits BYU to 
enforce its Judgment against the $15 million in sale proceeds received from WordPerfect. 
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A. SoftSolutions knowingly engaged in business for years after the corporation 
had been dissolved. As a result, the unincorporated association is liable for the 
debts and obligations incurred and the sale proceeds which it received may be sued 
to pay creditors. 
B. The claims and remedies asserted against SoftSolutions under its common 
name are authorized by UTAH R. Civ. P. 17(d). 
C. The owners of SoftSolutions, together with Tremco and SoftSolutions 
Technology, became partners as a matter of law when they engaged in business 
under the common name of SoftSolutions knowing that the corporation had been 
dissolved in 1992. 
5. BYU is entitled to execute on the proceeds received fiom the sale of the 
assets which belonged to the unincorporated association 
6. There has been no violation of due process and the District Court has been 
careful to make sure that no due process rights have been deprived. The Court has held 
multiple hearings and given every person an opportunity to be heard. It is not a violation 
of due process for an unincorporated entity to be sued by its common name and for the 
Court to enforce a judgment against its assets. Contrary to the arguments made, the 
Court has not allowed for the execution on personal assets. 
7. The District Court properly struck K. Duncan's affidavit. It violates the 
parol evidence rule, is contradicted by the record before the District Court, is not based 




Sections I through IV contain BYU's arguments regarding the propriety of the 
Tremco Judgment. Sections V and VI address the jurisdiction and due process of the 
Supplemental Order. Section VII advocates the District Court's decision to strike the 
Affidavit of Kenneth W. Duncan. 
I. TREMCO AGREED IN WRITING TO ASSUME THE INDEBTEDNESS 
OWING TO BYU UNDER THE LICENSING AGREEMENTS. 
The law is well settled in Utah that when a party agrees to be responsible for a 
debt owing to another, the assumption of the debt makes the creditor a third-party 
beneficiary as a matter of law. See Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc., v. 
Blomquist, 173 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989).7 In Ron Case Roofing, a sub-contractor sued the 
shareholders of the general contractor corporation based upon the terms of a settlement 
agreement between the corporation and its shareholders, which provided, in part, as 
follows: 
The Vesper group "agree to pay all indebtedness which is presently 
outstanding or in the future may arise which claims relate to the furnishing 
of labor, materials, equipment, tools, fuel, supplies and other items 
furnished to or incorporated into the Vesper Project. 
7
 The Ron Case Roofing decision is based on Section 302 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, which Utah courts have long followed to determine whether a non-party is 
entitled to the rights of a third-party beneficiary under a contract. See, id.; Clark v. 
American Standard, Inc., 583 P.2d 618, 620 (Utah 1978). Section 302(l)(a) provides: 
A beneficiary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a 
right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the 
intention of the parties and .. .the performance of the promise will satisfy an 
obligation of the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary. ... 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 302(l)(a) (emphasis added). 
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/</.,773P.2datl386. 
The shareholders in Ron Case Roofing raised the same arguments that Tremco 
asks this Court to accept. In response thereto, this Court held in Ron Case Roofing that 
"one who assumes a debtor's obligations creates enforceable third-party beneficiary 
rights in the debtor's creditors." Id. at 1387 (citations omitted). This Court rejected the 
argument that the sub-contractor was not identified as a third-party beneficiary. In 
analyzing the agreement this Court stated: 
Giving these words their "usual and ordinary meaning," Commercial Bldg. 
Corp. v. Blair, 565 P.2d 776, 778 (Utah 1977), it is plain that the parties 
intended that the Vesper group would pay all obligations of Brooks due 
those furnishing labor and materials on any Vesper project, a description 
that includes Ron Case. Judged by the standards summarized in section 
302 of the Restatement and followed by our cases, Ron Case is, therefore, a 
third-party beneficiary under the settlement agreement, as the trial court 
held. See Wasatch Bank of Pleasant Grove, 703 P.2d at 300; Tracy Collins 
Bank & Trust, 652 P.2d at 1315. 
Ron Case Roofing, 113 P.2d at 1386. In Tracy Collins Bank & Trust v. Dickamore, 652 
P.2d 1314 (Utah 1982), the Court indicated that when the performance of the promise 
satisfies or recognizes an actual or supposed duty of the promisee to the beneficiary, then 
the third-party may recover as a third-party creditor beneficiary. Id. at 1315; see also 
Palmer v. Davis, 808 P.2d 128, 131 (Utah 1991); Treasure Valley Foods, Inc. v. J-M 
Poultry Packing Co., 564 P.2d 978, 980 (Idaho 1977); Kennedy v. Lynch, 513 P.2d 1261, 
1263 (N.M. 1973); Argys v. McGlothlen, 276 P.2d 983, 985 (Colo. 1954) (en banc). 
As a creditor that was specifically named in the Tremco Agreement, BYU 
obtained third-party beneficiary status when Tremco agreed to be solely responsible for 
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the BYU claims as follows: "Tremco consents and acknowledges that Tremco is the 
responsible party with respect to the BYU claims and is solely responsible for the defense 
and pursuit of claims with respect to that matter."(R2000. 56) (emphasis added). The 
Tremco Agreement even clarified that BYU's claims related to the "royalties claimed 
owing under license arrangements regarding the Dsearch algorhythm" and further 
provides that: 
In conjunction therewith, Tremco shall assume all costs and expenses of 
every nature, including legal costs and expenses with respect to the current 
disputes with BYU and shall indemnify and hold SoftSolutions harmless 
from any and all claims, damages or liabilities or any nature, including but 
not limited to costs and attorneys fees, stemming from or in connection 
with, BYU's claims with respect to the DSearch algorhythm. 
(R2000. 55-56.) The Tremco Agreement is dispositive that Tremco assumed the 
obligations owing to BYU under the license agreement. As such, the District Court's 
entry of summary judgment against Tremco for the indebtedness owing to BYU was 
appropriate. 
II. BECAUSE TREMCO HAD ASSUMED THE INDEBTEDNESS OWING TO 
BYU AND CONTROLLED AND PAID FOR ALL OF THE LITIGATION 
CONCERNING THAT INDEBTEDNESS, THE FINAL ORDER MADE IN 
THAT LITIGATION IS BINDING UPON TREMCO. 
The District Court correctly held that the SoftSolutions Judgment, and the findings 
and conclusions supporting the SoftSolutions Judgment, are binding upon SoftSolutions 
and its "privies" pursuant to the doctrines ofres judicata and/or collateral estoppel. (R. 
The doctrine of res judicata "has two branches: cclaim preclusion' refers to the branch 
which has often been referred to as 'res judicata' or 'merger and bar' [and] 'issue 
preclusion' [which] refers to the branch often termed 'collateral estoppel.'" Boudreaux, 
1999 UT App 310, f20 (citing In re Rights to Use of All Water, 1999 UT 39,1[15). 
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1047.) See In re General Determination of Rights to Use of All Water, 1999 UT 39, 982 
P.2d 69. Res judicata and collateral estoppel prevent parties or their privies from 
relitigating claims or issues which were litigated on the merits and brought to a final 
judgment. Bourdreaux v. State, 1999 UT App 310, [^20, 989 P.2d 1103. 
The following elements are necessary for the doctrine ofres judicata or collateral 
estoppel to apply: (1) the party against whom preclusion is sought must have been a 
party, assignee, or privy to the prior adjudication; (2) the claims or issues decided in the 
prior action must be identical to those presented in the instant action, or in the case of res 
judicata, the claims or issues may be those which could have been raised but were not; 
(3) the claims and issues in the first action must have been completely, fully, and fairly 
litigated therein; and (4) the action must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
See In re Rights to Use of All Water, 1999 UT 39,1fi[l6-l8; accord Fitzgerald v. Corbett, 
793 P.2d 356, 359 (Utah 1990); Parklane Hosiery Company, Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 
(1979); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 
313 (1971). As set forth below, each of the foregoing elements is satisfied. 
A. Tremco and Its Shareholders are Privies of SoftSolutions Because They 
Controlled and Paid For the SoftSolutions Litigation. 
"A person who is not a party to an action but who controls or substantially 
participates in the control of the presentation on behalf of a party is bound by the 
determination of issues as through he were a party." Restatement (Second) of Judgments 
§ 39. The United States Supreme Court explained that: 
To preclude parties from contesting matters that they have had a full and 
fair opportunity to litigate protects their adversaries from the expense and 
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vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and 
fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of 
inconsistent decisions. 
These interests are similarly implicated when nonparties assume control 
over litigation in which they have a direct financial or proprietary interest 
and then seek to redetermine issues previously resolved. As this Court 
observed in Souffront v. Compagnie des Sucreries, 111 U.S. 475, 486-487, 
30 S.Ct. 608, 612, 54 L.Ed. 846 (1910), the persons for whose benefit and 
at whose direction a cause of action is litigated cannot be said to be 
"strangers to the cause .... [0]ne who prosecutes or defends a suit in the 
name of another to establish and protect his own right, or who assists in the 
prosecution or defense of an action in aid of some interest of his own ... is 
as much bound ... as he would be if he had been a party to the record." See 
Schnell v. Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc., 365 U.S. 260, 262, n. 4, 81 S.Ct. 557, 
559, 5 L.Ed.2d 540 (1961); cf. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 
Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 111, 89 S.Ct. 1562, 1570, 23 L.Ed.2d 129 (1969). 
Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 154(1979). 
As set forth above, Tremco agreed in writing to assume the indebtedness owing to 
BYU. (R. 521-22). As a result of the foregoing assumption, Tremco litigated and 
undertook the defense in the litigation with BYU. Indeed, Tremco stipulated that K. 
Duncan, L. Duncan and Tedjamulia, who were officers of both SoftSolutions and 
Tremco, "continued to direct the conduct of BYU's pending arbitration against 
[SoftSolutions]" and that Tremco paid for the legal services provided in the arbitration. 
(R. 1031-32.). Tremco acknowledges the foregoing in the Tremco Agreement: 
A. Prior to the date hereof, certain disputes have arisen with 
respect to claims by Brigham Young University ("BYU") as to 
royalties claimed owing under license arrangements regarding the 
Dsearch algorhythm. 
B. Tremco has been involved in defending that action and has, 
itself, asserted various claims against BYU as offsets or absolute 
defenses. 
* * * * 
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1. Tremco consents and acknowledges that Tremco is the responsible 
party with respect to the B YU claims and is solely responsible for the 
defense and pursuit of claims with respect to that matter. 
(R. 521-22) (emphasis added). The Tremco Agreement was signed by Duncan as 
the president and Chief Executive Officer of SoftSolutions Technology and by A. 
Tedjamulia, Vice President of Tremco. (R. 521.) 
Because Tremco agreed in writing to be responsible for the claims owing to 
BYU and because Tremco stipulated in writing that it directed and paid for the 
litigation with BYU, Tremco is a "privy" to that litigation and is bound by the 
findings, conclusions and judgment made in those proceedings as a matter of law. 
B. The Claims and Issues Alleged by Tremco Are Identical to the Claims and 
Issues Raised or Which Could Have Been Raised in the Primary Litigation. 
Res judicata's "obvious purpose is to discourage successive applications based on 
the same grounds." Boudeazix, 1999 UT App 310,1[ 20 (citations omitted). It is clear 
that Tremco "s alleged claims were presented or were available to be presented in the 
earlier litigation. (R2000. 41-52.) Indeed, any claims Tremco may have had certainly 
would have arisen prior to the arbitration in September 1996 because Tremco's alleged 
claims and defenses related to the 1987, 1988 and 1990 license agreements with BYU. 
Importantly, Tremco admits that it had "asserted various claims against BYU as 
offsets or absolute defenses." (R2000. 55-56.) Tremco's admission that it was involved 
in and asserted defenses in the arbitration is supported by the record which reflects this 
Court's ruling that royalties accrued on the sale of CLASS Conflicts of Interest product, 
"a product developed and sold by ... Tremco Consultants, Inc." (R2000. 13.) Based 
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upon the foregoing, the District Court was correct that Tremco's claims and defenses 
were or could have been presented in the arbitration proceeding, the subsequent litigation 
before the District Court, and in the prior appeal affirmed by this Court. (R. 1046.) 
C. The Claims and Issues Asserted in the Primary Action were Completely, 
Fully and Fairly Litigated. 
The memorandum decision by the arbitrator addressed the same claims and 
defenses which Tremco alleged in the subsequent proceedings, including but not limited 
to the fact that: (1) the D-Search technology and system failed; (2) that BYU failed to 
provide the necessary support; (3) that BYU failed to protect the D-Search patent; and (4) 
that BYU impermissibly allowed other to use D-Search. (R2000. 41-52). As a result, the 
written decision by the arbitrator and the SoftSolutions Judgment made by the District 
Court are conclusive evidence that the same claims and defenses alleged by Tremco were 
fully, fairly and completely litigated between the parties in the primary action. 
D. The Prior Litigation with BYU Resulted in a Judgment on the Merits that 
was Affirmed by this Court. 
As heretofore stated, on July 7, 1998, the SoftSolutions Judgment was entered by 
the District Court. This Court affirmed that final judgment on May 19, 2000, but for a 
minor modification in attorneys' fees. See SoftSolutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young Univ., 
2000 UT 46, 1 P.3d 1095. As such, the District Court was correct in determining that a 
final judgment on the merits had been entered. 
In sum, because all of the elements needed for the application of res judicata and 
collateral estoppel were fully satisfied in the prior litigation between the parties, the 
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District Court did not error or abuse its discretion in applying those doctrines to its 
decision which granted BYU's motion for summary judgment. 
III. THE EXISTENCE OF SEPARATE ENTITIES DOES NOT PRECLUDE 
APPLICATION OF THE RES JUDICATA DOCTRINE TO PRIVIES. 
Tremco cites several cases and argues extensively that BYU's claim must fail 
because BYU did not prove an "alter ego" relationship. While an alter ego relationship 
likely existed between Tremco and SoftSolutions, Inc., the alter ego issue is not 
dispositive of the application of the "privy" doctrine for purposes ofres judicata. The 
doctrines are separate from one another. Tremco is liable as a "privy" under the final 
judgment made by the District Court because Tremco and its officers and directors 
controlled and paid for the litigation, had a financial stake in the outcome, and as a result 
Tremco's interests were fully represented in the litigation. Again, Tremco acknowledged 
this in the Tremco Agreement by declaring that Tremco was already asserting its claims, 
offsets and absolute defenses against BYU's D-Scarch claims. (R. 521-22.) 
The decision in Searle Brothers v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689 (Utah 1978) fully supports 
BYU's position. In that case, this Court clarified that the "privy" doctrine applies to final 
judgments if "one's interest has been legally represented at the time." Id. at 691. The 
same doctrine was applied by this Court in Tanner v. Bacon, State Engineer, et ai, 136 
P.2d 957, 960 (Utah 1943). More recently, this Court explained that the "privy" doctrine 
also applies to claims or interests which "could have been" presented in the earlier action. 
See In re General Determination of Rights to Use of All Water, 982 P.2d at 70. As such, 
it is simply inaccurate for Tremco to argue that the doctrines of res judicata and/or 
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collateral estoppel apply to privies only if those privies are determined to be alter egos of 
one another. Such has never been the law. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS 
STANDARDS BY MAKING A JUDGMENT AGAINST TREMCO. 
Appellants try to position their appeal as being based on a violation of due 
process. However, as discussed above, the appeal is about Tremco's written assumption 
of the claims owing to BYU, its assumption and full control of the litigation with BYU 
and the binding effects of the SoftSolutions Judgment entered by the District Court as a 
result of those proceedings. 
The primary case relied upon by Appellants is Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazletine 
Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 89 S.Ct. 1562 (1969). However, the opinion provides that 
proceedings like those brought against Tremco are indeed proper. 
Likewise, were it shown that Hazeltine through its officer, Dodds, in fact 
controlled the litigation on behalf of HRL and if the claim were made that 
the judgment against HRI would be res judicata against Hazeltine because 
of this control, that claim itself could be finally adjudicated against 
Hazeltine only in a court with jurisdiction over that company. See G&C 
Merrian Co. v. Saalfield, 241 U.S. 22, S.Ct. 477, 60 L.Ed. 868 (1916); 
Schnell v. Peter Exkerich & Sons, Inc., 365 U.S. 260, 81 S. Ct 557, 5 L.Ed. 
546(1961). 
Id. at 111-12. This is precisely what BYU has done. BYU obtained a Judgment against 
SoftSolutions in litigation that Tremco paid for, controlled and participated in. Also, 
Tremco had a financial stake in the outcome because its claims and defenses were raised 
therein and because it had agreed to be responsible for the payment of BYU's D-Search 
claims. Accordingly, once BYU obtained the SoftSolutions Judgment and Tremco 
reflised to pay the Judgment, BYU sued Tremco and asserted therein the doctrines of res 
36 
judicata and collateral estoppel for the reasons discussed. BYU's actions were in 
complete harmony with the Zenith decision. 
Moreover, although the Supplemental Order is not on appeal, Appellants argue 
that the Supplemental Order violates their process rights. However, the Supplemental 
Order was entered in response to BYU's motion for summary judgment and declaratory 
relief and after a full and complete hearing was conducted by the District Court. Indeed, 
Tremco appeared with its counsel and presented an extensive argument at the hearing. 
After the hearing, the Court determined that the $15 million in sale proceeds which had 
been transferred to the owners of SoftSolutions (i.e., KWD, AST and Julee), could be 
used to satisfy the SoftSolutions Judgment. The Court further determined that if a 
dispute arose concerning the traceability of those proceeds, a person could request a 
hearing from the District Court at the time of the garnishment or execution proceeding 
and the Court would then conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the 
proceeds had been adequately traced by BYU. Indeed, such a process is a common 
procedure under UTAH R. CIV. P. 64 and 69 when a judgment debtor transfers property to 
avoid collection. Since the entry of the Supplemental Order, the District Court has 
indeed conducted an evidentiary hearing with respect to the tracing of such proceeds, a 
full hearing was given by the District Court to the entity which received a portion of the 
sale proceeds. In sum, contrary to Appellants' accusations of the District Court depriving 
them of their due process rights, the District Court has been very careful to protect the 
due process rights of all parties involved. 
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V. THIS COURT LACKS APPELLATE JURISDICTION TO HEAR ANY 
APPEAL OF THE JULY 10, 2002 SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER. 
The Supplemental Order, which was made exclusively to aid in the collection of 
the July 8, 1998 SoftSolutions Judgment9 is not a final order for purposes of appeal 
because Appellants filed several Post-Judgment Motions pursuant to UTAH R. CiV. P. 52, 
59 and 60 (R.l 117-19, 1155-57, 1478-81), and no notice of appeal has been filed by 
Appellants since the adjudication of those Post-Judgment Motions. Accordingly, but 
respectfully, this Court lacks appellate jurisdiction to review the Supplemental Order at 
this time. Although UTAH R. APP. P. 4(a) requires an appeal to be filed within 30 days 
after the entry of the final order, UTAH R. APP. P. 4(b) indicates that the order is not final 
for purposes of appeal until any timely filed post-judgment motions have been 
adjudicated and a final order entered thereon. UTAH R. APP. P. 4(b). 
Indeed, counsel for Duncan, et al. acknowledged to the District Court that "this 
July 10th order is not yet a final order, it is not yet appealable because of the post 
judgment motions which preclude its being determined a final order until such time as 
these motions are either granted or denied." (R. Supp. 81-82.) Because no notice of 
appeal of the Supplemental Order has been filed since the District Court denied the Post-
9
 Appellants' argument that the Supplemental Order was made to enforce the Tremco 
Judgment is not supported by the record. The opening paragraph of the Supplemental 
Order states unequivocally, that "BYU sought a supplemental order to assist it in the 
collection of the money judgment made and entered in favor of BYU by this Court, as 
modified by the Utah Supreme Court." (R. 1150) The very next paragraph defines the 
word "Judgment" in the Supplemental Order to be "the money judgment heretofore made 
by this Court, as modified by the Utah Supreme Court in its decision in the matter of 
SoftSolutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young University, 1 P.3d 1095 (Utah 2000)." (Id.) The 
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Judgment Motions, this Court lacks appellate jurisdiction to review the Supplemental 
Order at this time. 
A. A Notice of Appeal Filed Before the District Court's Adjudication of the 
Post-Judgment Motions Fails to Confer Jurisdiction on This Court. 
This Court has recognized that "[a] notice of appeal filed before the disposition of 
a proper post-judgment motion is ineffective to confer jurisdiction upon this Court." 
Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Hafen, 723 P.2d 425, 426 (Utah 1986) (citations 
omitted); UTAH R. APP. P. 4(b) ("A notice of appeal filed before the disposition of any of 
the above motions shall have no effect."). Indeed, 
[a] timely motion to alter or amend the judgment or for a new trial filed 
under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 52(b) and 59 suspends the finality of 
the challenged order or judgment rendering "a notice of appeal filed prior to 
disposition of such a motion by entry of a signed order [ineffective] to 
confer jurisdiction on an appellate court. 
Regan v. Blount, 1999 UT App. 154, Tf 4, 978 P.2d 1051 (quoting Anderson v. 
Schwediman, 764 P.2d 999, 1000 (Utah App. 1988)). 
In Anderson, the appellant filed his notice of appeal after the district court issued 
its ruling denying the appellant's motion to alter or amend the judgment, but before the 
district court made its written order with respect to the motion. The Court of Appeals 
dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction holding that even though the 
district court had made its ruling, "a notice of appeal filed prior to entry of such order is 
premature and does not confer jurisdiction on this Court." Anderson, 764 P.2d at 1000. 
Similar to Anderson, the Appellants in this case filed their notices of appeal before the 
Court then ordered that "BYU's motion, which seeks supplemental relief in connection 
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entry of any order reflecting the District Court's denial of their Post-Judgment Motions. 
Thus, as in Anderson, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the Supplemental Order. 
B. The Appellants' Post-Judgment Motions are Not Rule 60(b) Motions. 
Tremco argued before the District Court that the Supplemental Order was a final 
order and that Tremco's post-judgment motion was "properly cast under Rule 60(b)" and 
not under Rules 52 or 59. Although Tremco's post-judgment motion does not cite the 
rule upon which it is based, it is the law of this state that "[r]egardless of its caption, 'a 
motion filed within ten days of the entry of judgment that questions the correctness of the 
court's findings and conclusions is properly treated as a post-judgment motion under 
either Rules 52(b) or 59(e).'" Bonneville Billing & Collection v. Torres, 2000 UT App. 
338,14, 15 P.3d 112 (citing Reeves v. Steinfeldt, 915 P.2d 1073, 1076 (Utah App. 1996) 
(construing a paper entitled Motion to Reconsider to be a motion under rules 52 and 59)). 
Even if Tremco's Post-Judgment Motion was construed exclusively under Rule 
60(b), the Post-Judgment Motions filed by SoftSolutions and Duncan, et al. clearly 
precluded the Supplemental Order from becoming final. See UTAH R. APP. P. 4(b) 
(motion filed "by any party" requires new notice of appeal to be filed). Indeed as 
previously mentioned, Duncan, et al. argued to the District Court below that the 
Supplemental Order was a non-final order because of the several Post-Judgment Motions. 
(R. Supp. 81-82.) Accordingly, because the Supplemental Order is not a final order for 
purposes of appeal, this Court lacks appellate jurisdiction to review the Supplemental 
Order at this time. 
with the enforcement of this Court's Judgment, is hereby granted." (R. 1143) 
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VI. BYU IS ENTITLED TO ENFORCE ITS JUDGMENT AGAINST THE 
APPROXIMATELY $15 MILLION DOLLARS IN PROCEEDS RECEIVED 
BY THE OWNERS OF SOFTSOLUTIONS 
BYU is entitled to execute upon the nearly $15 million dollars in proceeds 
received by the owners of SoftSolutions to pay for the SoftSolutions Judgment under one 
or more of the following alternative theories. 
A. KWD, AST and Julee are Jointly Liable for Debts Incurred after 
SoftSolutions' Dissolution. 
Utah law is settled that officers, directors and/or shareholders of a dissolved 
corporation who cause the dissolved corporation to act like a corporation but knowing 
that the corporation has been dissolved, become personally liable for the debts incurred 
by the dissolved entity. 
In 1992, the Utah legislature adopted the Utah Revised Business Corporation Act, 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-l et seq. which expressly repealed the de facto corporate 
doctrine which allowed dissolved corporations to act as de facto corporations despite the 
dissolution of the corporate veil. With the repeal of the de facto doctrine, the new Act 
provides that "all persons purporting to act as or on behalf of a corporation, knowing 
there was no incorporation under this chapter, are jointly and severally liable for all 
liabilities created while so acting." UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-204 (emphasis added). 
The foregoing statute applies to actions taken by officers, directors or shareholders of the 
corporation after its dissolution. In Steenblik v. Lichfield, 906 P.2d 872 (Utah 1995), this 
Court explained: 
As to corporations that have been suspended and not reinstated, we hold 
that officers and directors who continue the business of a suspended 
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corporation are personally liable for all debts and liabilities arising from 
those operations that are a continuation of the types of activities the 
corporation performed. Under such circumstances, the relationship of 
persons who continue the operations of a suspended corporation is like the 
relationship of pre-incorporation promoters, which is-essentially that of 
partners. Thus, persons who act as if pursuant to valid corporate authority, 
after that authority has been suspended, are personally responsible for 
liabilities arising from the continued operations. {First Nat 7 Bank of 
Boston v. Silberstein, 398 S.W.2d 914, 915-16 (Tex. 1966)). They are 
jointly and severally liable with those who know the corporation's authority 
is no longer effective but continue its operations. 
Id, at 878 (citations omitted), see also, Murphy v. Crosland, 915 P.2d 491, 495 (Utah 
1996). In the present case, a final judgment was made and entered in favor of BYU 
against SoftSolutions and affirmed by this Court. The litigation was commenced long 
after SoftSolutions was dissolved in 1992. Indeed, it cannot be disputed that 
SoftSolutions business was carried on after its dissolution and that damages were 
awarded through March 1996. 
In addition, Duncan testified that the licenses transferred to WordPerfect as part of 
the SoftSolutions Technology stock sale were owned by SoftSolutions and that 
SoftSolutions Technology obtained those licenses from SoftSolutions without paying any 
consideration. (R. Supp. 60-62.) Tremco admitted this fact before the District Court 
early in the litigation. (R. 719) ("Before [SoftSolutions5] dissolution these licenses, 
including the DSearch license from BYU, were assigned to [SoftSolutions Technology], 
and [SoftSolutions] had no other assets."). Additionally, Duncan testified repeatedly that 
42 
SoftSolutions Technology was "incorporated as a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
SoftSolutions, Inc."10 (R. Supp. 63, 68-69.) 
In sum, because the owners of SoftSolutions knowingly continued in business long 
after the corporation had been dissolved and incurred debts and liabilities owing to BYU 
under its licensing agreement up through 1996, the owners of SoftSolutions are jointly 
liable for the debts and judgment owing to BYU. 
B. UTAH R. Civ. P. 17(d) Provides that an Unincorporated Entity May be Sued 
by its Common Name and that a Judgment Made in Such Common Name 
Binds all of the Property Owned by the Association. 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 17(d) expressly provides that when an association, which is not a 
corporation, transacts business under a common name, whether it comprises the names of 
the members of the association or not, the association may be sued by such common 
name, and the judgment obtained against the association shall bind the joint property of 
all of the associates in the same manner as though all of the members of the association 
had been individually sued. UTAH R. ClV. P. 17(d). 
In compliance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, SoftSolutions was sued by 
its common name in the action brought in the District Court in 1996, (years after the 
corporation had been dissolved by the State of Utah) (R. 2000 31, 56; R. 1030-32.) The 
District Court made a money judgment against the dissolved entity (i.e., the SoftSolution 
Judgment), which was affirmed by this Court on appeal. However, the owners of the 
dissolved entity refused to pay any part of the SoftSolutions Judgment despite this 
10
 Ken Duncan recanted this testimony three weeks later (and after consultation with 
counsel), but was unable to give any specific independent reason for his "new" 
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Court's affirmance thereof. As such, the SoftSolutions Judgment is enforceable against 
all joint assets of the Association including the approximately $15 million in stock sale 
proceeds the Association received from the sale of its assets to WordPerfect. 
Consequently, the District Court properly concluded and ordered that BYU may enforce 
the SoftSolutions Judgment against the assets of the unincorporated Association 
including but not limited to the nearly $ 15 million obtained from the sale of SoftSolutions 
Technology stock to WordPerfect. (R. 1044.) 
Contrary to Appellants' accusations, at no time has BYU ever attempted to 
execute on the personal assets of K. Duncan, L. Duncan or A. Tedjamulia. 
C. The Owners, Officers and Directors of the SoftSolutions Association, were 
Partners Because They jointly Engaged in an Unincorporated Business to 
Make a Profit. 
A partnership is defined as an association of two or more persons to carry on as 
co-owners of a business for profit. UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-1-3. Similarly, a joint venture 
is an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners of a single business 
enterprise. Id. § 48-1-3.1. Such an association, "does not always arise pursuant to formal 
agreement; rather it is a relationship voluntarily entered by the parties and may be proven 
by the actions taken by the parties." Rogers v. M.O. Bitner Co., 738 P.2d 1029, 1032 
(Utah 1987) (referring to a joint venture). A joint venture/partnership exists when two or 
more parties form "a community of interest in the performance of the common purpose, a 
joint proprietary interest in the subject matter, a mutual right to control, a right to share in 
recollection. (See, R. Supp. 76-78.) 
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the profits, and ... a duty to share in any losses which may be sustained." Bassett v. Baker, 
530 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah 1974). Each of these elements exists in the Association. 
Under Utah law, "all partners are liable ... jointly for all other debts and 
obligations of the partnership, except a partner may enter into a separate obligation to 
perform a partnership contract." UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-l-12(b). After SoftSolutions' 
was dissolved in 1992, the prior shareholders of SoftSolutions together with Tremco and 
SoftSolutions Technology, which entities the owners also completely owned, managed 
and controlled, "formed a community of common interest in the performance of the 
common purpose." Bassett, 530 P.2d. The Association's purpose was to continue 
operating SoftSolutions' business for profit under Ihe name of SoftSolutions. Indeed, the 
record clearly shows that after SoftSolutions was dissolved, SoftSolutions continued 
operating under the license that BYU issued to SoftSolutions pursuant to the 1990 
Agreement. (R2000. 22, 338-334; R. 507, 1045, 1148-1149.) 
Long after SoftSolutions was dissolved, SoftSolutions Technology, another 
partner in the Association, continued to receive and conceal royalties owed to BYU. In 
1994, SoftSolutions Technology transferred SoftSolutions license to WordPerfect in 
exchange for approximately $15 million (R. 1218-65). All of the business conducted by 
Tremco and SoftSolutions Technology under the SoftSolutions license was part of the 
common purpose of the Association. The furtherance of the Association's common 
purpose was also facilitated by the fact that both Tremco and SoftSolutions Technology 
had joint control or a right to exercise some degree of control over the business activities 
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of the other because they had identical shareholders, directors and officers (R2000. 22) 
and because they shared employees (R2000. 55). 
Furthermore, the Association's members had, and knew that they had, a "duty to 
share any loses that may be sustained" by the Association. This is evidenced by the fact 
that the two partners, SoftSolutions Technology and Tremco, entered into an indemnity 
agreement to "clarify the respective responsibilities of the companies with respect to the 
BYU claims." (R2000. 56.) The agreement was made so the assets of the partnership 
could be placed into SoftSolutions Technology and sold to WordPerfect for more than 
$15 million. Because of the foregoing event, and because the Association refused to pay 
the SoftSolutions Judgment once affirmed on appeal, the District Court properly 
determined and ordered that BYU could enforce the SoftSolutions Judgment against the 
$ 15 million in sale proceeds received by the Association from WordPrefect. 
D. BYU is Entitled to Execute on the Association's Joint Assets Received 
from the Sale of SoftSolutions Technology Stock to WordPerfect. 
"If a creditor has obtained a judgment on a claim against the debtor, the creditor, if 
the court orders, may levy execution on the assets transferred or its proceeds." UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 25-6-8. Tremco admits that at the time SoftSolutions purportedly to assign 
its rights under the license agreements with BYU to SoftSolutions Technology that there 
were no other assets belonging to SoftSolutions. (R. 1043; R.Supp.65-67.) As such, it is 
undisputed that SoftSolutions, if treated as a separate entity, was insolvent at the time the 
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foregoing transfer was made because the sum of SoftSolutions' debts were greater than 
its assets (none) at a fair valuation pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-6-1.11 
In addition, because SoftSolutions, if treated as a separate entity, had no assets 
after the transfer of the license, SoftSolutions did not receive anything in exchange for 
the transfer. As such, the transfer made by SoftSolutions to SoftSolutions Technology 
was fraudulent as to BYU. Thereafter, SoftSolutions Technology's assets, i.e., the 
license rights obtained from BYU, were transferred to WordPerfect for approximately 
$15 million. Accordingly, the District Court's July 10, 2002 Supplemental Order was 
indeed lawful and appropriate. 
E. Proceeds of the SoftSolutions Technology Sale Were Improperly 
Distributed to the Prior Shareholders of SoftSolutions Before the Claims of 
Creditors were Paid. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-I0a-1408 provides that if a corporation causes its assets to 
be distributed to its shareholders before the claims of creditors are paid, the shareholders 
are liable to the extent of the value of such distribution. The law is based in part on the 
equitable doctrine that such distributions are assets of the corporation held in constructive 
trust by the shareholders for the benefit of creditors and are subject to execution. Thus, 
the District Court properly determined that BYU was entitled to an order allowing it to 
recover from the assets which had been distributed to the shareholders of the dissolved 
SoftSolutions entity before the debts and obligations of the corporation were paid. 
F. The Supplemental Order is Factually Sound. 
11
 SoftSolutions was also presumed insolvent, pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-6-3, 
because it was not paying it debts as they became due. 
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The facts supporting the District Court's Supplemental Order are not disputed. In 
1990, BYU and SoftSolutions entered into the 1990 License Agreement, which gave 
SoftSolutions the exclusive rights to use D-Search (R. 1218-65.) Although the 1990 
Agreement contained a clause restricting assignment, SoftSolutions assigned its license to 
SoftSolutions Technology without BYU's knowledge or approval (R2000. 18-19.) 
SoftSolutions Technology, as an affiliate of SoftSolutions thereby became liable along 
with SoftSolutions for the royalties generated from the sale of SoftSolutions 
Technology's products. (R2000. 18-19,22.) 
After SoftSolutions was dissolved in 1992, SoftSolutions Technology continued to 
act in the name of SoftSolutions for many years, sold products using D-Search and 
generated millions of dollars in royalties that were owed to BYU under the 1990 license 
agreement. (R2000. 22-23.) In spite of the Association's success using BYU's property, 
it did not remit the royalties to BYU (R2000. 22-23, 44.) 
VII. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
STRUCK THE IMPROPER AFFIDAVIT FILED BY KENNETH DUNCAN. 
In a civil case, the district court's "decision to admit evidence is reviewed under a 
broad grant of discretion." In the Matter of the General Determination of the Rights to 
the Use of all the Water, 1999 UT 39, ^ f 25 (citations omitted). In this case the District 
Court struck Kenneth Duncan's affidavit because it violated the parol evidence rule, 
contradicted the prior record before the District Court and the arbitrator, was not based on 
personal knowledge, and contained statements which were otherwise inadmissible under 
the Utah Rules of Evidence. (R. 1035- 38.) 
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A. The Duncan Affidavit Violated the Parol Evidence Rule. 
When a written agreement is unambiguous and clear on its face, extraneous or 
parol evidence should not be admitted. See Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 
1293 (Utah 1983); see also E.A. Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc. v. Broderick, 522 
P.2d 144 (Utah 1974). In Broderick, this Court emphasized that 
Parol evidence may not be given to change the terms of a written agreement 
which are clear, definite, and unambiguous. To permit that would be to 
cast doubt upon the integrity of all contracts and to leave a party to a 
solemn agreement at the mercy of the uncertainties of oral testimony given 
by one who in the subsequent light of events discovers that he made a bad 
bargain. 
Broderick, 522 P.2d at 145-46. The District Court's determination that portions of the 
affidavit "attempt to alter tenns of the contract which is violative of the parol evidence 
rule" (R. 1037) is within the District Court's broad discietion and should be upheld. 
B. The Duncan Affidavit Contradicted the Record before the District Court. 
A trial court can strike statements that are contradicted by the law of the case and 
the record before the district court. See Cohen v. Goodfriend, 665 F. Supp. 152, 160 
(E.D.N.Y. 1987). As correctly determined by the District Court, the Duncan Affidavit 
was unsupported by the record, specifically regarding the fact that Tremco had "been 
involved in defending [the SoftSolutions] action and has, itself, asserted various claim 
against the Plaintiff as offsets or absolute defenses." (R. 1037, R2000. 147). 
C. The Duncan Affidavit Was Not Based on Personal Knowledge. 
An affidavit "must be made on personal knowledge of the affiant, and set forth 
facts that would be admissible in evidence to show that the affiant is competent to testify 
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to the matters stated therein." Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp., 508 P.2d 
538, 542 (Utah 1973); accord Western States Thrift & Loan Co. v. Blomquist, 504 P.2d 
1019, 1020-21 (Utah 1972) (affidavit must be based on personal knowledge); GNS 
Partnership v. Fullmer, 873 P.2d 1157, 1164-65 (Utah App. 1994) (same). The District 
Court's determination that the Duncan Affidavit is without foundation to testify regarding 
the intentions and motivation of other officers and directors of other entities is supported 
by the record and well within the discretion of the District Court. 
D. The Duncan Affidavit Attempted to Make Impermissible Conclusions. 
The law is well-settled that a lay witness may not testify concerning the law or 
make legal conclusions. Marx & Co., Inc. v. Diner's Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505 (2nd Cir. 
1976); Stoler v. Perm Central Transp. Co., 583 F2d 899 (6th Cir. 1978). In addition, 
statements in affidavits that are "conclusory in form" are improper and "may not be 
considered on summary judgment under Rule 56(e)." Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 
859 (Utah 1983). The Court undertook a "careful review" of these statements and found 
them to be "inadmissible conclusions ... prohibited as support for a motion." (R. 1038.) 
Such a determination by the District Court is within its discretion and should be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing this Court should uphold the Fourth District Court's 
June 13, 2002, judgment against Tremco Consultants, Inc. Furthermore, the Court should 
dismiss any appeal of the July 10, 2002, Supplemental Order for lack of appellate 
jurisdiction. However, if this Court determines it may review the Supplemental Order, 
the Court should affirm the entry of the Supplemental Order. 
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